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Darwinism and the Meaning of Life
ArthurFalk
Abstract: Even when Darwinism is constrained to consist merely of
theses that follow from biological science, it provides the material
for persons to construct the meaning of their lives, once they
understand their situation in the world. But this modest Darwinism
leaves open the question whether that meaningfulness includes a
place for religion, which remains a choice each society and each
individual in that society must make.
My talk will have four parts: After a section defming my terms and a
section clearing away four misunderstandings, I'll turn to positive
claims in the two remaining parts. My main thesis is that Darwinism
does give us the meaning of life, but only up to a point. It has a blank
spot on the subject of religion, which we may fill in as we please.
I. Defming my terms
I begin by defming the two ideas in my title. I wish I knew who
invented the phrase, "the meaning of life." Was it Monty Python?
Probably not. Perhaps it was Leo Tolstoy.! Whoever it was, he sure
came up with a humdinger. The meaning of life is a meaningfulness
that comes from one's sense of one's situatedness, from which one's
projects (i.e., one's large life-purposes) and values spring. Let me
spell this out. First, there's no point in my thinking about the
meaning of life in general unless it provides meaning to my own life.
It's a kind of knowledge I can directly apply to myself here and now.
One kind of knowledge is impersonal, like a map or a calendar.
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Science is impersonal like that. One's sense of being situated is the
other kind of knowledge, which one gets when one sees the little
sign on the map, "You are here," and the note on the calendar,
"today." I'll call this our "knowledge in the fIrst person," referring to
the fIrst person pronouns, "I" and "me," which we use to express this
sort of knowledge. We may think biological science provides an
impersonal catalog of the kinds of beings there are. First personal
knowledge comes when I identify which of the catalog's entries is
the kind of being I am. Thus the meaning of life brings in who I am
in the order of things and how I'm situated, not just in space but also
in time. This sense of situation is the basis of the meaning of life,
with purposes and values growing from it. I don't think you can have
purposes and values without fIrst having a sense of being situated.
The meaning of life also refers to an idea of a complete life that
suggests how to organize one's daily activities in terms of it, some
all-encompassing goals or purposes, in other words, one's projects.
Once they're achieved and we fmd ourselves in states of fulfIllment,
happiness, self-realization, do these consummatory states then give
meaning to our lives? It doesn't make sense to ask what their
purpose is, because they're the fulfIllment of purposes. But we can
ask what value they have. If they lack positive value, the purposes
they fulfIll are delusions; the climax should not be an anticlimax. So
we must look for the positive values these states realize. If we can
fInd some, they'll give meaning to our lives? To sum up, the
meaning of life is a meaningfulness expressible in the fIrst person,
one's sense of one's situatedness, from which one's projects (i.e.,
large life-purposes) and one's values spring.3
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with the logical discipline required to restrict oneself to just what can
be deduced from the science. It's the latter I want.
ll. My main negative claims
So to our topic: What does Darwinism tell us about the meaning
of life? My first claims will be negative, and there'll be more cold
splashes later. This is because scientific Darwinism is seriously
misunderstood in the general public. We must begin with
corrections.
My first negative thesis is that Darwinism is not
noncommittal on the question of the meaning of life. You may have
expected me to bring up the so-called naturalistic fallacy.6
Philosophers call it a fallacy to derive values from facts or equate the
two. Science can give us only the facts, they say. Well, physics or
chemistry can give us only the facts, but what about biology and
psychology? Contemporary biologists and psychologists shy away
from claiming scientific validation for any set of values, but I
suspect that life and values cannot be separated. I think that, as
biology matures, it will tell us about the values that life enhances.
Already an important subdiscipline in evolutionary biology and
ecology is life-histories, how in a species the lives are lived from
birth to death. For the human species there are the disciplines of
behavioral ecology and evolutionary psychology, once called
sociobiology.? One fmds oneself exercising stem control over one's
beliefs to avoid drawing conclusions about values from these
disciplines, so obvious are the conclusions.
4
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A plausible reason for thinking that Darwinism must be
noncommittal on the meaning of life is that this is something
involving the ftrst person point of view, and no scientiftc theory says
anything about the ftrst person point of view. Theory is like that
map I mentioned; it tells you how things are laid out, the grand
scheme of things. It may get detailed enough to say at what date a
person named Arthur is in the Bernhard Student Center in
Kalamazoo. If you're a determinist, you'll think: science could be
this speciftc. But unless I know I'm Arthur, and now is that date,
and here is the Student Center, I could not infer from what science
said that I am this person standing here. Knowledge of myself in the
ftrst person and of the time in terms of now; that's legitimate
knowledge, and it's a kind of knowledge that's not contained in
science. So I concede the premise of this objection, but reply that, to
get the meaning of life from science, we add what we know in the
ftrst person to what science tells us, and the combination tells us
life's meaning.
I don't think: I've just lapsed into a grandiose Darwinism.
There's nothing cosmic in my combination of Darwinism with my
situatedness. If even modest Darwinism can suggest values, I
suspect they'll be very speciftc to my situation.
The rest of my talk amounts to stating the necessary
qualifters and caveats that must be attached to my claim that values
can be derived from the facts of biology. For starters, natural
selection always reveals values late, often too late. Today's
populations are adapted to yesterday's environments, because the
selection was done by yesterday's environments. To the extent that
today's environment does not differ from yesterday's, the tardiness
5
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of the revelation of value won't matter. But with human activity
affecting the global environment, from mass extinctions of species to
global warming, it's urgent that we not appeal to our adaptations by
natural selection to straightawayjustify our way of living today. For
that, we'd have to defend the thesis that today's environments are
sufficiently like yesterday's.
My second negative claim is that Darwinism does not tell us
that there's just one meaning of life, the same for all living things.
Some still think the meaning of life is the competition that leads a
few to great success, many to lesser success, and many more to utter
failure. That view says that the meaning of life is the process of
natural selection itself. "Do unto others before they do it unto you."
That's the view called social Darwinism, which justified capitalism
unfettered by legal oversight, as though predatory practices were
good. Darwinism as I use the term is not social Darwinism, which
errs in two ways. A science-based Darwinism does not espouse the
predatory route to fitness and reproductive success as the meaning of
life, first of all because that claim ignores the various ways evolution
has in fact occurred, some of which are quite pacific.8 Predation is
only one of several mechanisms by which evolution by natural
selection occurs. There are cases of evolution by mutual aid, that is,
symbiotic evolution. Changes occur in two lineages of organisms
that improve their symbiotic relationship, like the proboscises of
bees and the lengthening of flower tubes, the combination
optimizing the getting of nectar and the carrying off of the pollen.
There's also evolution by direct adaptation to a physical
environment, not involving any interaction with the biotic
6
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environment, where the notion of competition applies. Did cactuses
beat up anybody to become adapted to desert life? I think not.
There's also evolution by noncompetition, evolution's version of
"less is more." Evolving to exploit an as-yet-unexploited ecological
niche is an instance. Secondly and more importantly, a science-
based Darwinism does not fmd values in the process of evolution,
but rather in its products, the adaptations themselves. So even if
evolution did only occur by predation, social Darwinism would still
be wrong.
Nor does biology endorse the old view that pleasure is the
meaning of all sentient life. The experience of pleasure is usually
associated with an activity that's good for us, such as the exercise of
some power we have. Pleasures can be things like the exhilaration of
achievement or even something as simple as looking at beautiful
things. Pleasure seems to have evolved to tell organisms when
they're doing something right. Pain tells the opposite story. I take
this insight to be endorsed by Darwinism. If that's so, occasionally
pleasures and pains lie. An example of a false pleasure is a dream
that one is experiencing a sexual orgasm (and let's say, for men the
dream is not accompanied by an ejaculation). Surely, we can
recognize this as a pleasure that's false. Then we see that we even
arrange to be lied to when we resort to modem methods of
circumventing the normal pathways of the brain, to deliver pleasures
without any activity other than taking a euphoric drug like cocaine,
or a legal substance like refined sugar. These too are false pleasures.
It's not just that the falseness of a pleasure reduces its goodness just
as its brevity or mildness would, but rather the goodness it has is
derivative from the adaptive association of agreeableness with
7
The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Vol. XVI No.4
truthfulness. My conclusion: It's not the pleasure that gives meaning
to our lives, but rather the activities we take pleasure in. The
goodness of pleasures is only partly due to their being agreeable; the
other part is their telling the truth. Hedonism focuses on the
agreeableness but forgets the truthfulness. We feel a pleasure, with
no truth to dignify it, as false when it gives way to a sense of let-
down. A sybaritic life of false pleasure is a meaningless life.
Recall my fIrst negative thesis, and notice I've just qualifIed
it. However much an action's being an adaptation and being the
source of pleasure is an indicator of its positive value, adaptation and
pleasure are not foolproof indicators, nor are they detailed enough.
Another reason Darwinism does not reduce all life to a single
meaning is that it's a theory of the evolution of each and every
species, each one of which has its own way of living. If Darwinism
indicates a generic meaning of life, say "fItness," it's empty of
content until fleshed out as one or more meanings for human life,
and another set of meanings for another species, and a third set of
meanings for a third species, and so on.
Suppose Darwinism describes the life of a species well
enough for it to say what values members of that species are built to
pursue. Still it's not the meaning of every life lived by members of
that species. This is my third negative thesis. Darwinism does not
subscribe to the traditional notion of a species as an essence. An
essence is supposed to be something necessary, in the sense that any
individual must have that essence in order to be the kind of thing it
is. A lion would have the essence of lionhood, making it a lion; a
human being would have the essence of humanness. And bodily
8
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organs would have essences too. Thus the essence of hearts would
be to be blood-pumps. This notion goes way back to ancient
philosophy. Darwinism has no truck with it. Instead, according to
Darwinism, the separateness of coexistent species is an artifact of the
extinction of the varieties intermediate between them. There's no
essence which unites all members of a species; instead there's a
series of accidents which isolates the members of a species from
members of other species enough to prevent interbreeding.
Darwinism promotes an alternative to essentialism, which I'll call
population thinking. According to this way of thinking, a species is
a population of variant forms, each of which preserves the ability to
freely interbreed with the others of the opposite sex. As long as a
population has that trait, it can vary in indefmitely more ways. And
if there is a barrier to interbreeding, then no matter how similar two
populations are, they count as two species. An example is the strong
similarity between small mouth and large mouth bass in some lakes.9
They don't interbreed.
There's the danger of reading the very undarwinian idea of
essentialism into the question of the meaning of life, leading to the
idea that one size fits all. Many of the traditional arguments about
what is "contrary to nature," like those against birth control, are
based on essentialist misunderstandings of biology. Consider the
argument, "Genitals and acts involving them are for procreating.
Period. Therefore such acts as are not for procreating are contrary to
nature, Q.E.D." Well, no, not even of species for whom that
"Period" is true.10 More generally, some people think that biology
becomes an alternative basis for traditional natural law theory. No
again: that's still essentialism; instead we must bring population
9
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thinking to bear on the meaning of life. Even within a species
there's at most what statisticians call a central tendency among the
diversity in the population. Extrapolating this lesson to the question
of the meaning of life, there'll be variant meanings of the lives lived
by a freely interbreeding population. So the values revealed by
Darwinism will not be laws to obey; they'll be tugs toward ideal
ways of living. I'll exploit this idea later when I get around to saying
positive things.
I don't worry about drawing values from Darwinism
eventually; I do worry about drawing them prematurely, and thereby
getting the values wrong. I've heard that some argue on Darwinian
grounds that it's ok for low status males to commit rape!11 Egads! As
a caution, my fourth negative claim is that Darwinism is not a
fmished theory. Many areas of theory are still much debated. We as
outsiders can look in and see where the majority opinion among the
experts happens to be at the moment, but as outsiders it would be
prudent not to prejudge the issues. The areas of debate that have
most relevance to giving the meaning of human life are group
selection and sexual selection. First, has selection of groups, even at
the expense of individuals, had a significant role in the evolution of
humanity? If so, we may have to reconsider the role of altruism in
the meanings of human life.12 Secondly, was Darwin right about
species that have sexual reproduction, that the female sex chooses
which males will get to reproduce, and so selects for male traits like
aggressive-ness? This is sexual selection, which would complement
natural selection. Not only are males at odds with each other on this
view, it predicts female interests are at odds with their mate's
10
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interests. Might there be instead a kind of social selection
emphasizing common interests? Joan Roughgarden, a professor of
biology and geology at Stanford University (and, by the way, a
transgendered woman), has written a book called Evolution's
Rainbow, which seeks to undermine the primacy of Darwin's theory
of sexual selection.13Roughgarden asks, what if competition and
coalitions occur within a sex as well as between sexes, for the
purpose of access to, and control of, the whole shebang of resources
needed to produce and rear offspring, not just access to the opposite
sex? What if this led to the selection of traits in both sexes that are
social rather than antisocial? Theories of male aggressiveness and
female coyness would need nuancing. On the other hand, the
psychologist Geoffrey Miller argues in The Mating Mini4 that
sexual selection, when both sexes exercise mate choice and invest in
parenting, does explain our sense of community and morality. Either
way, a 12 year-old excellent introduction to evolutionary
psychology, Robert Wright's The Moral Animal/5 is already out of
date.
Not just Darwinism, but all science, is incomplete. So let's
not draw conclusions about the ultimate fate of the universe
according to science. To do so ignores that we're on the verge of
another expansion of our view of what counts as the totality of what
exists, equivalent to earlier realizations that the universe was more
than our solar system inside a sphere of fIxed stars. The totality of
things is probably not just our universe. Our universe is one of an
incredibly large number of universes sprouting like bubbles from a
cosmic bubble pipe (so to speak).16We know something about the
fate of our sun and even our universe, but neither fate is the fate of
11
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the totality. What then is ultimate for science? Scientists don't
know; science simply peters out at its extremes, on the largest scale
and on the smallest scale. When you hear theologians talking of the
ultimate fate of things according to physics, put it aside as
uninformed. Science and religion don't tell different ultimate
stories. Rather, religion tells an ultimate story unrelated to any
scientific evidence, and science confesses that any story it'll ever be
able to tell will probably fall short of being an ultimate story.
ill. My positive claims
Even if biology does tell us something about human values, for
them to be effective, we must embrace them in a first person way.
Or we might turn away from them. We either have to own our
humanity or become alienated from it. I propose we own our
humanity, and each of us own our variant form of it. I'll now make
positive claims about three ubiquitous features of human lives,
which we can call the three Cs: copulation, culture, and
consciousness, particularly the consciousness of time passing.
Unlike the four Fs, which some of you may know, my three Cs are
serious and adequate to the human experience.
Could anything be clearer than that copulations help give
human life meaning? (I promise this paragraph is rated PO-I7.)
Copulations are the consummation of intragenerationallove. Human
females are in continuous estrus, sexual receptivity, and have cryptic
ovulation, not showing the male when his sperm can lead to
conception. Human males are sperm factories in 24-7 operation.
12
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Simple biology suggests that frequent copulation is meant to be part
of adult human life. Without getting too graphic, copulations provide
the glue that binds couples and makes families. Of course,
noncopulatory love, like that between parents and children and
spreading out to relatives, is another glue for families, just as
important. For most of us, the meaning of life is the meaning of life
in families. Perhaps it's symptomatic of the question about the
meaning of life that it seems most pressing for youths, caught in
between the families they were children in and the as-yet-unformed
unions in which they'll become parents. They sense their temporary
loss of meaning during this riskiest time of their lives when courtship
is supposed to occur.
Family life is so central for the meaningfulness of the lives
lived in families that good social policy would protect and further the
family. I for one would foster conditions that help reduce adultery,
abandonment, cuckoldry, pregnancies out of wedlock (formerly
known as bastardry), spouse abuse, child abuse, unrealistic
expectations and unpreparedness, and the other ills of American
family life that undermine the contract of monogamous marriage and
cause horrendous divorce rates.17
The other thing about copulations is that the centrality of
matings within families is only that, a strong central tendency within
human populations. I don't think society should discriminate against
the sexual behavior in private among consenting adults, which falls
outside the central tendency and which is not injurious or contrary to
the person's own contractual obligations, such as the marriage
contract. Society should also protect alternative public gender
expressions, such as Joan Roughgarden's, from hate crimes and
13
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unfair practices. And let's be clear about the reason for tolerance.
It's not because Darwinism provides these atypical people with an
excuse for the way they are. Do left-handed people make excuses
for their left-handedness? Neither should gay people. To offer an
excuse is to admit that, if one did not have the excuse, one would be
blameworthy. Using biology to make excuses is a misuse of biology,
even if genetic determinism were true, and it's not. Some more
negative theses for you: genetic determinism is not true, and biology
is not in the business of manufacturing excuses, nor would it be,
even if genetic determinism were true. Rather there's nothing here
requiring excuse, from a Darwinian point of view, because variation
is normal, even if the variants are atypical of the central tendency.
Central tendencies among a range of variations are not indicative of
essences; they only indicate the contingent and accidental18shaping
of prior generations of a population by natural selection.
We may feel that an atypical variant behavior leads to a less
than fulfilling life, and feel we ought to steer young people toward
more fulfilling ways of living. Sometimes that's very true; I'm
thinking of a heterosexual man's choice to be a cad, not a dad. I do
think a dad-life is more fulfilling in the long run than a cad-life. So
I'd recommend preserving a distance in status and prestige between
marriage and mere cohabitation without commitment (sometimes
even concerning who pays the next month's rent). American parents
tend to indulge their children too much in this regard. Not to
preserve unique privilege and highest regard for the marriage
contract imposes a cost in status on married couples and the
institution of marriage, a cost of the kind economists call an
externality.19I'd appeal to Darwinism here, which I think justifies
14
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some inequalities and some discrimination to preserve them. But
before dads act paternalistically, they should ask themselves whether
a life-style's reduced power to be fulfilling is due to the nature of the
variation, or is it only the result of society's discrimination against
it? If the former, how alterable is the variant? If the latter, we should
direct our reforming efforts toward society rather than the
individuals who suffer the discrimination. This is the way I'd
recommend gay people explain themselves. They should use the
opportunity to teach, not mistreat themselves by making biological
excuses. And they should concede there are more fulfilling and less
fulfilling ways of being gay.
Culture is another biological fact about human beings.
Again, what could be clearer than that one's culture helps settle the
meaning of one's life by providing projects? For the purposes of my
talk, our culture defmes modes of excellence. Unlike other primates,
whose culture, insofar as they have any, consists of tools and skills,
our culture embodies our values. I include language as value-
creating. Consider how many forms of human excellence are
inconceivable without language, science for example. Another value
is monogamy. Does the biology of the human species dictate
monogamy? Probably not, but our culture does. Does biology
predict its failure? No, only that it won't be easy.
The ideals embodied in our culture are passed on to the next
generation mainly through families, and that accounts for the great
importance to society of fostering the ideals of family life. Parents
and older children are role models for the values of their culture,
forming the child's sense of the meaning of its own life. Youths are
15
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naturally idealistic and will emulate those who manifest
meaningfulness and nobility of spirit in their own lives.
Any culture is a cornucopia of varieties of human excellence.
For Americans and Chinese it's glorious to become rich. So success
in business is a mode of excellence. The Olympic Games and the
Wodd Series defme another form of excellence. But so are
successes as a writer, as a scholar, as an athlete, as a butler, and
literally thousands of other ways of being excellent, skillful, or
successful. Each of us must choose the modes of excellence we'll
strive for in our lives. We cannot strive for all, so we must choose to
narrow down, to exclude alternatives. Excellence in one area is
sufficient for meaning, even if it comes at a great price in overall
well-roundedness. Think of Beethoven and Wittgenstein, Bobby
Fisher and Emily Dickinson. Our choices may require hardship and
suffering. Nothing in this picture of the meaning oflife requires it to
be easy or cheap or happily content. But also nothing in it requires
excessive expense, that is, that we achieve the top rung on the ladder
of excellence for our lives to be meaningful. But the life of a couch-
potato is empty and unfulfilling, even if it be sybaritic.
Darwinism tells us that human beings are culture-driven
animals, and so we should look to a culture for the specifics. These
specific human values are the creations of a population that
recognizes and rewards with status those who pursue their
realization. Status or rank in a social hierarchy, in a community, is
important, and it goes with being a role model. High status is
necessarily rare, and so, yes, there's competition, but it's as much a
striving toward meeting an ideal as it is defeating another person.
And social competition is bounded by rules of fair play. We also
16
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recognize that people are free to break with cultural givens and strike
out on their own. This is the noncompetitive strategy for status.
Think of Jackson Pollock, the paint-spiller; his paintings now hang
beside Rembrandt's.
Finally, there's consciousness, another result, along with
culture, of that three pounds of intricately interconnected tissue
called the brain. Because of our consciousness we reflect on the
spread of our existence from the past into the future. The essential
feature of our experience of time is passage, ephemerality. We live
in time; at any time we have a past which we recall, a present we
experience, and a future we anticipate. The present passes,
transferring the near future into the recent past. The fugacity of
temporal experience is a part of the knowledge I call knowledge in
the fIrst person, our sense of situatedness. Our situation is always
changing. Apart from our experience, time would be like the way
it's represented on a calendar; passage does not affect calendars. We
cannot say this ephemerality is irrelevant to the meaning of life
because it's part of situatedness. But does it enhance meaningfulness
or detract from it? I want to say consciousness of time's
ephemerality enhances positively the meaningfulness of life.
Let's scrutinize the theistic story. I think that the religious
story about life portrays our temporality as a negative thing. Notice
how it fIghts the temporality of existence. First of all, its god is
traditionally taken to be the philosopher's god, whose perfection
requires that it be outside time altogether. For if it changed, it would
change from having a perfection to lacking one or from lacking one
to having it, in either case the conclusion being that at some time it's
17
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not perfect. Secondly, there's the postulate of human immortality,
which does not get us all the way outside time as is the case with
god, but we escape many of the consequences of being temporal
beings. Its most delusory consequence is that it gives us the false
idea that the only achievements worth anything are lasting ones. The
very idea, say, at the Olympics of setting a record in some sport,
only to see it surpassed the following day, is a vanity of vanities. I
think that conclusion is the wrong use of consciousness. One's
situatedness in time is what makes values relevant. How does it
subtract from the value of a sublime piece of music that it has an
ending?
And now for another negative thesis. Darwinism does not
offer an alternative escape from temporality. One may think of
evolution by natural selection as directional, onwards and upwards.
This is the idea of progress, which many have read into biology.
Notice that this principle is just the temporal extension of
essentialism. The goal of the process would be to fit the essence,
which would be the process's acme. What has misled serious
thinkers into this error? Perhaps its source is that natural selection
can be directional. But natural selection can also be a stopper, a
maintainer of the status quo. It can split and go off in multiple
directions. And it can reverse directions as in the case of the pepper
moths who evolved to be black from being greyish, and then evolved
back to being greyish. Another example is the cave fish with
vestigial eyes. They evolved to be blind. There's also devolution by
natural selection. We cannot look to Darwinism to tell us what the
long-term direction is. Even that can change.
18
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Temporality goes with death. Father Time is brother to the
Grim Reaper. Philosophers are fond of pointing out that we seem to
be the only animal that knows it will die. Well obviously,we are the
only animal that knows X, where X stands for pretty much anything
you can think of. What's so special about knowing we'll die? Who
was it who said that a truly aware person lives his life always with
the prospect of his death before him? I don't care, because it's
phony profundity.20
What does Darwinism say about death? We're talking about
a particular type of death, not accidental death or the kind of death
called apoptosis, which afflicts some kinds of cells. We're talking
about the deaths that the decrepitude of aging makes virtually
certain. This is called senescence. Time for another negative thesis.
What evolves need not be adaptive. Senescence evolved but was
never selected for, and so it's not an adaptation. It's a maladaptive
trait, but it could not be selected against effectively, because
senescence is a time-dependent pleiotropism. What does that mean?
Genes can have more than one effect on the organism's structure and
behavior-that's the pleiotropism-and the effects can occur at
different times of life. That's the time-dependency. Thus genes that
promote reproductive success earlier in life may have the effect of
causing the organism to senesce later in life. Yet those genes get
selected for early on, and the later negative effect is not sufficient to
create a counter-balancing selection against. So genes with late-
onset effects can accumulate. There's no one single gene for
senescence, just as there's no death gene. The many genes
contributing to senescence increase vulnerability to death, but if the
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genes' earlier contribution to the organism's reproductive success is
enough to ensure their continuation in the gene pool, natural
selection forgives the later effects that limit reproductive success.
Darwinism explains death, but gives it no special meaning.
Let's be upbeat. Darwinism puts a positive spin on our
temporality. At any time in our lives, we recognize an ideal for
ourselves which we have yet to realize. We human beings with our
culture and consciousness recognize a condition we might call the
acme of our lives and the golden age of our culture. As long as
there's time, there's hope of achieving it. Even when we're past our
prime, there are still ideals to strive for. So I follow Spinoza who
said that a virtuous person thinks about death least of all?! He's not
indifferent to death; that's Stoicism. No, death is evil. But a
Darwinian meaningfulness of your life is its meaningfulness-as-you-
live-it, immersed in the passage of time just as your life is. For
meaningfulness stems from one's temporal situatedness, as we noted
early on. If your life were to lose its meaningfulness-in-your-living-
of-it, could any eternal, everlasting meaningfulness make up for that
loss? Not for me it couldn't. So, as I live my life, I should focus on
the considerations that give it meaning then and there.
There's a tension in the meaning-of-life-as-you-live-it.
There's the evanescence, the passage of time, but there's also the
abiding element, because much persists, although nothing lasts. The
abiding element structures the evanescence and gives it unity across
time. The selfs unity is different from the world's unity, however.
World-unity is to be discovered in perception and science; self-unity
is to be made. The meaning of one's life depends on the abiding
element that one adds to the evanescence. For that element, let's
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look to commitments, which tie one's past to one's future. One
creates the meaning of one's life by making commitments. If they
had not been implicit in the way I described the fIrst C, commitments
would deserve to be a fourth C, because they're the true glue of
family and society, within which most people fmd meaningfulness.
They're either reaffirmed daily in one's actions, giving one's life a
pattern, or they're broken or never made at all, in the name of
freedom. But is a freedom from commitment a freedom for
something better? Rarely. The dad reafftrms his commitments to
family; the cad never makes them, and so his life is likely to be less
meaningful, in that it lacks integrity over time in this respect. It is
instead a picaresque life. (I am thinking of Casanova's memoirs.)
Have I merely expressed my preference for dads over cads (I
being a father protective of two daughters), or is there something
more substantial to back it up? I think Darwinism enters here to
substantiate that the patterns in one's life that contribute most to
meaning are those of family life and participation in the cultural
excellences of one's society. Aspiration toward patterning one's life
in these ways is so deeply ingrained in the kind of animal we are
that, according to some philosophers,22 the patterns are one's self
itself. I don't commit myself about that, which would equate having
a meaningful life with being a self. No doubt, though, one's
conception of the patterns one's life exhibits makes up one's concept
of oneself and determines the story one tells when one wishes to say
who one is. I've claimed that some patterns are more fulfIlling than
others, for instance, dad-patterns over cad-patterns. If there's to be
any truth of the matter, so that the cad must see himself as a cad if he
is to see the truth about who he is, Darwinist science will provide the
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objective criterion we should use. Look for biologists' discussions
of it under the heading of "r and K selection.',23 Dads follow K
strategies, cads r strategies.
The contingency of meaningfulness, the fact that a person or
a whole society might simply blow it, or have bad luck, is a source
of perpetual anxiety for a reflective person, and it may lead one to
try to transcend the contingency with a commitment of faith to the
deity. Faith says the meaning of life is not contingent. Faith also
claims to bind one's other commitments into a more unified whole,
when they're subordinated to the commitment to the deity. Thus the
person of faith has a sense of personal wholeness that's more
complete and seemingly less vulnerable to personal failure or bad
luck. A person who rejects faith may suspect a failure of nerve24
infects faith's concept of what it is to be human; it's a callow flight
from realism. From a less pejorative perspective the faithful are
"meaning-in-life overachievers.,,25
Critical reflection on what I've said about the third C,
consciousness, seems to renew the doubt it was meant to allay: Is
my positive spin on temporality mere indulgence in self-delusion?26
Is not the buzz of life doomed to crash, like a puppet show from
which the puppeteer is withdrawn? We know this foreboding as the
''vanity of vanities, all is vanity" frame of mind. Some people are
haunted by the specter of nihilism. But there's nothing logically
compelling about this thought. Perhaps for someone afflicted by it,
the best thing would be to be told to just get over it!27 Or get a
religion. I'm not being sarcastic.
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IV. The Incompleteness of Modest Darwinism
This past year I published a defense of a version of Pascal's
wager for religious faith, as a rational way to come to faith while still
accepting science.28 It says you should bet on faith because if God
exists, there's much to gain, and if he does not, there's little to lose.
That's a caricature merely, but I showed how something like that
wager could represent religious conversion. Conversion as I
described it is release from self-loathing, but I now realize this
picture of conversion makes my account mainly fit Christianity. I
should add release from a sense of nihilism, meaninglessness, as
another source of conversion. In conversions of this sort, defeat of
one's aspirations ceases to create meaninglessness, and the disunity
of mankind, in the sense that meaningfulness without God is
inevitably distributed unevenly among people, sometimes by sheer
luck or misfortune; that too is overcome and meaningfulness is
preserved despite its loss in the eyes of the world.
If my argument was right, atheists should accept that being
religious is compatible with being rational and with believing what
science says. A scientifically modest Darwinism is open to religion.
I mentioned the biologist, Joan Roughgarden. I just reviewed a book
of hers on this topic, Evolution and Christian Faith,29 in which she
makes that very point. She herself is a practicing Episcopalian. But I
also argued in my Pascal article that accepting the wager was not
required for rationality, that it was optional. I claimed that the issue
between the theist and the atheist was no longer over what it is to be
rational. It's rather over what it is to be human: Does being human
fit together with being god-dependent? Does the latter complete the
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former somehow? Modest scientific Darwinism leaves this huge
question unanswered, and that's a deficiency in its meaning of life.
Most people go with the theistic option, although 90% of the
1800 scientists who are members of the National Academy of
Sciences are atheists.3o Most societies also go with the theistic
option, cultivating social institutions that bias individual choice
toward religion. Thus the choice individuals are usually confronted
with is whether to stay with the religion of their youth or leave,
rather than whether to leave irreligion and join a religion. I don't
think that social biasing explains the whole of the lopsidedness of the
results. In post-communist societies, where the option is to stay with
the irreligion of one's parents or join a religion, there is more
tendency to turn to religion.
In my article I did not say how I inclined. I may have even
left the impression that I accepted the wager. But I do reject it
personally, although I recommend social institutions that bias its
members' choices toward religion.31 Irreligion should not come
easy; it should be the result of intellectual and moral struggle. One
must discover what it would be to be human without religion and
convert to it with one's whole heart and mind.
Insofar as the Darwinisms I called grandiose address this
question, they're more complete than the modest Darwinism I've
restricted us to. So the [mal word goes to grandiose Darwinism. Each
society and each member of the society must choose one. My own
grandiose position is neither the theism of de Chardin nor the
atheism of Dawkins, nor even the agnosticism of Thomas Huxley.32
Mine is a fourth: unimportantism. My sense of what it is to be
human makes the existence of a god unimportant for the meaning of
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my life; so I no longer give a twig whether a god exists or not.33 I'm
not afflicted with either self-loathing or a felt deficit of
meaningfulness. I completely accept my being a human animal with
human ideals. I'm happy with who I am, in my family, in my
culture, striving for an excellence my culture has defmed, and the
ephemerality of it all seems to add to its worthwhileness. I don't
begrudge the religious among us the comforts of their religion, but I
don't hide from myself the unequal distribution of meaningfulness
including the extreme chance of my life and others' losing all
meaning. Amen.
In preparation for this talk, I picked up my Bible34 and read
the book of Ecclesiastes. I found two excellent sayings. The first
was, "A fool multiplieth words" (10:14). The second was "Better is
the end of a speech than the beginning" (6:9). We've now reached
the better part of my speech. Thank yoU.35
Notes
1. In his Confession (1884). In the Introduction, page 8, of the
David Patterson translation (W. W. Norton and Co., 1983), the
following sentence is quoted from the original edition's introduction:
"Here unfolds the drama of a soul who has sought from his earliest
years the path to truth, or as the author refers to it, 'the meaning of
life'." A Russian prince, Eugene Troubetzkoy, published an article
in 1918 in three installments in The Hibbert Journal (vol. 16) on the
meaning of life. The phrase is everywhere in the article and in the
second installment's title. Howard and Edna Hong, the most recent
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translators of Kierkegaard' s work, have him referring to the meaning
of life in the 1840s.
2. Does my account miss something? A sense of being situated,
having large purposes and fmding the consummatory states valuable
make our lives meaningful. But given that life's meaningful, should
we go further and say what it is that life means, as though we were
deciphering a difficult sentence? To grasp it we must be able to state
its meaning. But what's the meaning of a life like George
Washington's? Being the father of his country? His life reduced to
five words? They cannot encapsulate the meaning of his life. That
would need as many words as it takes to write his biography. I'm
confused by what looks like a false analogy between words and
lives. The words must first have a meaning for them to be
meaningful. With lives, perhaps it's the other way round; it seems
that, for lives, meaningfulness comes before the meaning. Owen
Flanagan's theory of selfhood, to be noted near the end of part Ill, is
relevant here.
3. Most of us get our first idea of life's meaning from catechisms.
The first question in mine (The Baltimore Catechism from the
1940s) was, "Why did God make you?" And the answer was, "God
made me to know him, to love him, and to serve him in this world,
and to be happy with him forever in the next." In terms of purpose,
my job is to know and love God. In terms of values, well, being
happy for a while among my friends and family is not enough to
make life worth living, but being happy forever with God is. Note
also my being situated in the first of two lives, and my scale, rather
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huge I'd say, given that there's just me and God mentioned. That
was the meaning that life had for me until sometime in high school,
when I started to have doubts about whether there was a god, and
whether there was an afterlife.
4. Blaise Pascal, Pensees. I recommend either the Krailsheimer
translation (penguin, 1966) or the Ariew translation (Hackett, 2005).
The passage I quote is in section 423 ofKrailsheimer, in section 680
of Ariew. The popular Trotter translation (Modem Library, 1941) is
awful.
5. See de Chardin's The Phenomenon of Man (1955, translation:
Harper, 1959) and several books by Dawkins, e.g., The Blind
Watchmaker (W.W.Norton, 1986), some essays in his A Devil's
Chaplain (Houghton Mifflin, 2003) and his The God Delusion
(Houghton Mifflin, 2006).
6. The standard argument for the naturalistic fallacy's being a
fallacy is "the open question argument," formulated by the
philosopher, G.E.Moore. It always makes sense to ask of any
equation of an evaluative predicate, y, with a descriptive predicate, x,
"But is x good, really?" E.g., if fitness is equated with goodness, it
always makes sense to ask that of fitness. This openness only refutes
the idea that the equation is true analytically. Further, the question is
ambiguous, because it has a context-free reading and a reading in the
first person, present tense. Even if x is y in the context-free sense,
the question may be whether I, here and now, should pursue x. The
openness of that question does not show anything wrong with the
27
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equation in its context-free sense. See my Darwinism and
Philosophical Analysis (New Delhi: Decent Books, 2003), pp. 178-
186, for a more extensive defense of a naturalistic theory of value.
7. Richard Lewontin (New York Review of Books, October 20, 2005)
distinguishes the more ambitious sociobiology from its more
cautious successor, evolutionary psychology, in that the latter does
not use its models to make very specific predictions. Lewontin, an
adversary of both developments, sees the move as one from being
false to being vacuous. I am more hopeful. For a persuasive defense
of evolutionary psychology against another recent attack, see
Edouard Machery and H. Clark Barrett, "Debunking Adapting
Minds," forthcoming in Philosophy of Science, also available from
Machery's homepage, www.pitt.edu/-machery.
8. G. Ledyard Stebbins, Processes of Organic Evolution Third
edition (prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 100-106.
9. The example is from G. C. Williams, Natural Selection (Oxford,
1992), p. 119.
10. The reason it does not work for, e.g., bovines is that any
essentialist argument would entail that evolution could not break the
constraint on copulation without generating another species. Note
how my idea of false pleasures works here. For us, orgasms of
copulations that cannot lead to reproduction are not necessarily false,
but they would be for bulls and cows, where semen production and
ovulation coincide.
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11. My point is not the question begging one that the current
biology has got to be wrong because the values derived from it are
wrong. See Joan Roughgarden, Evolution's Rainbow (University of
California Press, 2004), pp. 172-174, for a criticism of the biology
underlying the conclusions of the evolutionary psychologists.
12. Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson, Unto Others (Harvard
University Press, 1998).
13. Joan Roughgarden, Evolution's Rainbow. See especially pp.
168-181. For a more scholarly presentation see Roughgarden,
Meeko Oishi, Erol Akyay, "Reproductive Social Behavior:
Cooperative Games to Replace Sexual Selection" Science 311
(February 17, 2006) pp. 965-969, and ten letters and authors'
response "Debate, Sexual Selection and Mating Strategies" Science
312 (May 5,2006) pp. 689-697.
14. GeoffreyMiller, TheMating Mind (Doubleday, 2000).
15. Robert Wright, The Moral Animal (Vintage, 1994). Wright
thinks sexual selection can only account for the extra-moral
characteristics of society, like the status hierarchy. Only kin
selection and reciprocity can account for ethical sentiments and also
their weakness. Miller is a healthy antidote to these restrictions.
16. George Johnson, "Oh, for the Simple Days of the Big Bang"
New York Times (Sunday, October 8, 2006), p. 3 of the "Week in
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Review" section. Johnson reports that the recently discovered
increasing rate of expansion of the universe is being thought of as
evidence for the many universes theory. See also Raphael Bousso
and Joseph Polchinski, "The String Theory Landscape" Scientific
American 291 (September 2004), pp. 79-84. See the illustration on
p. 86. It is reprinted in Scientific American, special editions, vol 15.3
(2005) The Frontiers of Physics.
17. For the prevalence of these in American society and their bad
consequences, see Richard Layard, Happiness: Lessons from a New
Science (penguin, 2005), pp. 60ff, 78ff, and 176ff.
18. Accidental is the opposite of essential, in philosophical jargon.
Popularly it means unintended. I mean both here. But I do not mean
random.
19. You bear an external cost in the reduced value of your house, if
your neighbors lease out their front yards as dumps. If you wear a
lapel-pin acknowledging your meritorious service, its value is
decreased if everyone wears look-alike lapel-pins. Does the
recognition of same-sex marriage impose external costs on
traditional marriage, sufficiently high to justify disapproving same-
sex marriage, as I think we should disapprove cohabitation? Clearly,
condoning cohabitation is much more corrosive; see Darren Spedale
and William Eskridge, "The Hitch" Wall Street Journal, October 27,
2006, editorial page. But are there still some external costs of the
look-alike type? I'd say, not enough to justify not legalizing same-
sex "civil unions." A semantic dodge to reserve the word
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"marriage?" Concerning externalities, perception is all. On that, see
Layard, cited earlier, chapter 9.
20. I don't defend either lying to oneself about the nature of death
and its inevitability or practicing denial in the face of its imminence,
but I reject making thinking of one's death a requirement for one's
being human authentically, which Martin Heidegger mayor may not
have claimed (Being and Time (1927), division IT, part 1). For
arguments that there's nothing conceptually special about death as it
applies to oneself as distinct from death in general, see Paul
Edwards's article, "'My Death'" in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Paul Edwards, ed. (Macmillan, 1965).
21. Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics (1677), Part IV, proposition 67,
where "free" is convertible with "virtuous." Of course the
circumstances in which one must live could become so extremely
bad as to warrant suicide.
22. E.g., Owen Flanagan, The Problem of the Soul (Basic Books,
2002), pp. 242ff.
23. Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Harvard
University Press, 1975),pp. 99ff.
24. The title of a chapter in Gilbert Murray, Five Stages of Greek
Religion, 3rd edition (Beacon Press, 1951). See StephenWeldon, "In
Defense of Science: Secular Intellectuals and the Failure of Nerve
Thesis," Religious Humanism, 30 (1996) for the subsequent history
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of the diagnosis of the impulse to other-worldly religion as a failure
of nerve.
25. Owen Flanagan's phrase, m "Self-Confidences," Self-
Expressions (Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 201. Peter J. Mehl
makes the charge against Kierkegaard at length in his Thinking
Through Kierkegaard (University of Illinois Press, 2005). Mehl
reveals his Darwinism on p. 166.
26. Darwinism does not say life has no meaning; it does not say our
quest for meaning, purpose and value is a delusion, a quest for self-
deception on a grand scale. When our catechismic conception (see
note 3) of the meaning of life was destroyed, it left a hole in our
picture, and that gaping hole defmes what we expect any conception
of the meaning of life to tell us. One of the losses is the sense of
cosmic grandeur of the theistic providential meaning of life. Some
people say it has a profundity and ultimacy that no nontheistic
meaning of life could come close to. Somehow, this little planet
among a gazillion planets, in this century among the millions of
centuries past and the many more to come is not a big enough stage.
The cosmos dwarfs it. A paltry skit is replacing a grand opera. So
these people say. Part of their sense of loss is the loss of being
stage-center. If we'd be willing to playa bit part, we'd find there is
an engrossing story, even if it's not about us. Could life have
meaning despite its playing a bit part in a story of cosmic dimensions
that's mostly about other things? Hmmm... Before God I was
merely humbled; but before everything else I am humiliated. I
suppose some would say that's the same thing as life having no
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meaning. They feel that hole as a huge gaping vastness. The first
point I wish to make is that the absence of a full substitute for a
religious answer is not the same as affirming there's no answer.
That would be like concluding that one's keys are gone forever just
because one checks one's pockets and finds they're not there.
27. Susan Wolf, "The Meanings of Lives" reprinted in Perry,
Bratman, and Fischer, Introduction to Philosophy, fourth edition
(Oxford University Press, 2007). Page 71: "The only advice one can
give to such people is: Get Over It."
28. Arthur Falk, "A Pascal-type Justification of Faith in a Scientific
Age" Philosophy 80 (2005) 543-563. I agree with the criticisms of
Pascal's version, which Alan Hajek makes in his article "Pascal's
Wager" in the online Stariford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and in his
article "Waging War on Pascal's Wager" Philosophical Review 112
(2003). I don't agree with his claim that there's no way to repair the
argument.
29. (Island Press, 2006). My favorable review is in The Quarterly
Review of Biology 82.1 (March, 2007) pp. 44f.
30. Edward J. Larson and Larry Witham, "Scientists and Religion in
America" Scientific American 281 (September 1999); also their
"Scientists are Still Keeping the Faith" Nature 386 (1997) pp. 435f.
31. See Layard, cited earlier, p. 64, for evidence that societies with
high belief in god are happier societies. Thus I encouraged my
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daughters to join a church when they were young, and again as
adults for the sake of the grandchildren. But I do think it matters
which church; see note 33. A second reason for preferring a society
biased toward religion is-I agree with Nietzsche-that a post-
religious atheism is more in accord with an ideal humanity than a
primitive atheism by default. For one, a passage through religion
can create wonderful experiences, such as of the beauty of holiness.
The prevalence of the primitive type of atheism by default in today's
irreligious societies accounts (I'd bet) for the reduced happiness in
them. I'm often tempted to say to such atheists, "Fool! You think
atheism endorses your succumbing to your miserable temptations."
My distinction between better and worse sorts of atheism keeps my
position from requiring me to be duplicitous about my
recommendations with regard to societies and children.
32. Huxley came to feel an ethical horror of natural selection, which
I share. See my "Reflections on Huxley's Evolution and Ethics" The
Humanist 55.6 (NovlDec 1995)pp. 23-25.
33. I do care about people's conceptions of god. The god ofthe Old
Testament and the god of medieval Christianity do not deserve
respect. Many Christians agree with my assessment of the medieval
Christian god. See William James's essay, "Is Life Worth Living"
(the second essay in his The Will to Believe and Other Essays
(Longman Green, 1896)), section III. He thinks my rebellion against
such a being is a proper first stage to a truer religion. But at this
stage I halt and stand at ease. Suppose god were to turn out not to
violate the Geneva Conventions in his handling of the prisoners
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taken in his cosmic war, I'd still decline the meaning he might offer
to give my life. If he turned out to be the totally other, pure love, or
incarnate in the person Jesus, well then I'd not harbor disrespect for
this god, and I'd recommend churches that see god in those ways
(seenote 30), but I'd still resist such a god's meddling with my life.
34. The Douay-Reims translation (1582-1610). Any resemblance of
these quotations to the original Hebrew, which they supposedly
translate, is purely coincidental.
35. My thanks to Jeff Seaver and a student of mine, Jill Pinkerton,
for the invitation to speak in October 2006 to the Freethought
Association of West Michigan, as well as for the suggestion of the
topic, and to Carl Bajema for good insights in correspondence about
the topic. An earlier version of the talk is published on the
Association's website, www.freethoughtassociation.org. Thanks to
my student Brennan Jacoby for leading me after that fIrst talk to
insights concerning what really should be a fourth C, namely,
commitments. Our society does push the ideal that copulation
should be tied to commitment; they go together "like a horse and
carriage," as the song says. A version substantially the same as the
present one is forthcoming in the journal Religious Humanism.
35
Publications By The Ethics Center
For further information about these publications or to receive a copy please contact the
Ethics Center at ethicscenter@wmich.edu or phone: (269) 387-4397.
VOLUME I






















Do Professors Need Professional Ethics as Much




Ethical Dilemmas in Health Care: Is Society Sending A Mixed Message?
No.3, February 1989
John V. Hartline, M.D.
Neonatology, Kalamazoo, Michigan
Codes of Ethics in Business
No.4, March 1989
Michael Davis
illinois Institute of Technology
Should I (Legally) Be My Brother's Keeper?
No.5, May 1989
Gilbert Geis
University of California - Irvine
VOLUME ill
Su"ogate Parenting: The Michigan Legislation
No. I, October 1989
Lucille Taylor, Majority Counsel
Michigan State Senate
Paul Denenfeld, Legal Director









Women's Dilemma: Is It Reasonable to be Rational?
No.4, April 1990
Harriet Baber
University of San Diego
VOLUME IV
Higher - OrderDiscrimination
No. I, July 1990
Adrian M.S. Piper
Wellesley College
Television Technology and Moral Literacy
No.2, November 1991
Clifford S. Cbristians
University of lllinois - Urbana





Owning and Controlling Technical Information
No. I, November 1991
Vivian Well
nlinois Institute of Technology




Lying: A Failure of Autonomy and Self-Respect
No.3, May 1992
Jane Zembaty
The University of Dayton
National Health Insurance Proposals: An Ethical Perspective
No.4, June 1992




No.1 & 2, November 1992
John Baker
University College, Dublin, Ireland
Reasonable Children
No.3 & 4, May 1993
Michael Pritchard
Western Michigan University
Helping to Harm? The Ethical Dilemmas of Managing Politically Sensitive Data












Na"ative, Luck and Ethics: The Role of Chance in Ethical Encounters, in Literature
and Real Life Experiences
No.3, February 1994
Nona Lyons
University of Southern Maine





Michigan's Deadlocked Commission on Death and Dying: A Lesson in Politics and
Legalism
No. I, January 1995
Joseph E1lin
Western Michigan University




Two Papers on Environmentalism II: Resources and Environmental Policy
No.3, March 1995
Jan Narveson
University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
Race Family and Obligation






No. I, January 1996
Brian Schrag
Association for Practical and Professional Ethics
Indiana University
A Thracian Charm and Socratic Teaching
No.2, May 1996
Arlene W. Saxon house
University of Michigan











Moral Theory and Moral Life
No. I, December 1996
Michael S. Pritchard
Western Michigan University










No. I, May 1998
Jan Narveson
University ofWaterioo, Ontario, Canada
















How Children and Adolescents Relate to Nature
No.3, May 2000
Patricia Nevers
University of Hamburg, Germany
VOLUME XIII
Ethics in Academia, 2000
No.1, December 2000
Essays By Elson Floyd, Diether Haenicke, Elise Jorgens,






The Ethics of Making the Body Beautiful: Lessons from Cosmetic Surgery for A














Prague, the Czech Republic




Director, Center for the Study of Ethics in Society
Brian Schrag
Executive Secretary
Association For Practical Ethics
Indiana University






The Ethics of Apology and the Role of an Ombuds from the Perspective of a Lawyer
No.1, May 2003












School Desegregation 50 Years After Brown: Misconceptions, Lessons Learned, and




Universities and Corporations: A Selection of Papers Presented at the Western Michigan
University Emeriti Council Forum
No.2, April 2006
Media Ethics: The Powerful and the Powerless
No.3, April 2006
Elaine E. Englehardt
Utah Valley State College
Membership 
Membership in the "Ethics Center" is open to anyone interested. 
There is no membership fee, although donations are appreciated. 
Please enroll me as a member of the WMU Center for the Study 







Send to: Center for the Study of Ethics in Society 
Western Michigan University 
1903 West Michigan Ave. 
Kalamazoo, MI 49008-5328 
The Center publishes papers of interest to readers. Distribution is 
free to members. Additional copies are available for $2.00 by 
contacting the Center. 
Lithograph on Front Cover: The Oaklands, WMU 
Center for the Study of Ethics in Society 
Western Michigan University 
1903 W. Michigan Ave. 
Kalamazoo, MI 49008 
